Abstract-For a spectrum sharing system using economic approaches, conventional models without geographic considerations are oversimplified. In this paper, we develop a model where geographic information, including licensed areas of primary users (PUs) and locations of secondary users (SUs), plays an important role in the spectrum sharing system. We consider a multi-price policy and the pricing power of non-cooperative PUs in multiple geographic areas. Meanwhile, the value assessment of a channel is price-related and the demand from the SUs is price-elastic. To maximize the payoffs of the PUs, we propose a unique quota transaction process. By applying an evolutionary procedure defined as replicator dynamics, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the evolutionary stable strategy quota vector of each PU, which leads to the optimal payoff for each PU selling channels without reserve. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs and hence the optimal payoffs. Furthermore, we introduce a grouping mechanism to simplify the process. In our simulation, the effectiveness of the learning processes designed for the two scenarios is verified and our spectrum sharing scheme is shown efficient in utilizing the frequency resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S
PECTRUM sharing is a secondary distribution mechanism to mitigate the growing conflict between scarce spectrum resources and explosion of wireless devices [1] . The basic assumption of spectrum sharing is a hierarchical system composed of primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs). When economic approaches are applied to the model of spectrum sharing, idle channels of PUs can be traded as merchandise. Channel transactions usually feature several properties. For example, channels are perishable assets.
Meanwhile, channels of different PUs are differentiable products, providing different utilities.
Geographical information, including licensed blocks of PUs and locations of SUs, plays an important role in a spectrum sharing system. In simplified models such as the dynamic multi-band sharing in [2] , utility-based cooperative game in [3] , two-tier market in [4] , supermodular game in [5] , and spectrum trading pricing game in [6] , each licensed block of PUs covers the entire system so that the relative locations of SUs with respect to PUs can be neglected. However, if each licensed block of PUs covers the system partially, permissions of channel transactions need to be granted according to the locations of SUs. In such a case, regional differences in supply and demand need to be taken into account. As a result, channel selection preference of each SU, channel selling preference of each PU, and channel prices of different regions become new parameters, which cannot be handled in the simplified models without geographical consideration.
User locations have been considered in several spectrum sharing games to model non-isotropic interference of SUs. In [7] , an inter-tier spectrum sharing algorithm between a macro cell and several pico cells in consideration of cell ranges has been built based on Stackelberg games. In [8] , a cellular operator balances between femtocell and macrocell services in a Stackelberg game based on the coverage of femtocell services. In both models, there exists only one PU in the spectrum sharing system. When there are multiple PUs, the selling competition among PUs and the different channel selection preferences of SUs need to be considered. In [9] and [10] , PUs' competition of shared bandwidth at neighboring locations has been studied, in which SUs are combined into independent sets according to mean valid graphs and floating channel prices among these sets. In [11] , dynamic spectrum access of multiple PUs and multiple SUs is designed as a multiauctioneer progressive auction. The optimal channel assignment is achieved by Kuhn-Munkres algorithm. However, the channel demand models of SUs in [9] - [11] are based on the simplified mechanism that an SU will buy a channel when the channel price is lower than a threshold. In practice, channel demand is a function of channel price.
Among existing spectrum sharing models, few consider the licensed blocks of PUs. In [12] and [13] , pricingbased decentralized spectrum access of SUs is studied in a Stackelberg game for two scenarios, monopoly PU market and multi-PU market. Although bounded licensed areas of the PUs are considered to perform admission control, channel selling preferences of the PUs are neglected due to the assumption that 0090-6778 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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all SUs are within the intersection of the PUs' licensed areas. In [14] , dynamic spectrum trading among multi-seller and multi-buyer is considered under deterministic and stochastic models. In the models, the spectrum access opportunities are restricted to the licensed areas of the PUs. However, similar to the models in [10] and [11] , the single price policy of the PUs and the simple channel demand model of the SUs limit the application of this approach to a large network.
In this paper, we consider both the locations of SUs and the licensed blocks of PUs. By modeling the multi-price policy of the PUs and the price-elastic demand of the SUs, we specify channel selling preferences of the PUs, channel selection preferences of the SUs, and channel prices of the PUs in different regions. Specifically, we consider a spectrum sharing system in a large geographic region based on our preliminary work in [15] , where the licensed areas of the PUs are bounded. Hence, each PU could sell idle channels only to the SUs in its licensed area. In such a scenario, the SUs have different lists of suppliers. On the other hand, based on the competition status, each PU has a chance to increase its payoff by selecting appropriate SUs to sell channels and setting appropriate prices for the SUs. To quantize the competition status, we establish a price-elastic demand model that incorporates both the double log demand (DLD) [16] and multi-nomial logit (MNL) models [17] . Our demand model is applicable to both oligopoly and monopoly markets, two common market structures for spectrum sharing [18] - [20] .
To maximize the payoffs of the PUs, we propose a unique quota transaction process. In the process, the PUs set the number of channels that they would like to sell to each particular SU, or quota. In our individual analysis for nonhomogeneous SUs, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) quota vector of each PU when the PUs sell channels without reserve. Based on the evolutionary procedure defined as replicator dynamics, we design a learning process to obtain the best integer quota (BIQ). Furthermore, we consider the scenario that the PUs sell channels with reserve. We predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs. Moreover, we apply a grouping mechanism when the SUs are homogeneous to simplify the process based on utility zones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we give our model of the spectrum sharing system. In section III, we propose our unique quota transaction process, based on which we discuss the ESS quotas for two scenarios, selling channels without reserve and selling channels with reserve. In addition, we design the learning processes for the two scenarios, respectively. Next, in section IV, we introduce the grouping mechanism to simplify the process. In section V, we present our simulation results for the two scenarios. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Setup
Suppose that there are M PUs and N SUs in a spectrum sharing system. For the mth PU, it has a supply of S m nonoverlapping channels to sell to the SUs. C m is the cost of each channel for the mth PU. We assume that a channel can be sold only once in a single transaction, and the transaction cost for each channel is C T . For the nth SU, it has a demand of D n channels given a budget price ψ n , which is the price that the nth SU expects to pay for a channel.
In our system, the mth PU is licensed to use a certain bandwidth in a specific geographic block A m and can only sell its idle channels in A m . For different SUs, their lists of suppliers are therefore not the same. In Figure 1 , we illustrate possible circumstances regarding the geographical relationship of the PUs.
We set (x n , y n ) as the location of the nth SU. Based on whether the nth SU is inside A m or not, we use t mn = 1 to denote the acceptance when (x n , y n ) ∈ A m and t mn = 0 the denial of a transaction that the nth SU offers to buy channels from the mth PU when (x n , y n ) / ∈ A m . We define p mn as the channel price at which the mth PU expects to sell to the nth SU. If t mn = 0, the mth PU cannot sell channels to the nth SU. In this case, p mn is set to the choke price [21] to avoid possible transactions. We define d mn as the number of channels that the nth SU offers to buy from the mth PU after the nth SU obtains the information of channel prices. Meanwhile, since transaction amounts may be different from demands, we define b mn as the number of channels that the nth SU actually buys from the mth PU. Note that b mn = 0 if t mn = 0.
B. Channel Utility
In our system, we use U mn to denote the channel utility obtained by the nth SU buying a channel from the mth PU. Based on the economic model in [22] ,
where u mn reflects the channel capacity, and mn is a linear price-income sensitivity function that describes how the channel utility is related to the channel price [23] . Specifically,
and
where δ > 0 and γ > 0 are weighting factors, W m is the bandwidth of each channel from the mth PU, and SNR mn is the signal to noise ratio that the nth SU can achieve when buying a channel from the mth PU, without breaking the interference temperature constraint on the boundary of A m [24] , [25] .
C. Demand Model
To determine d mn , we use the DLD and MNL models [16] , [17] to reflect the price-elastic demand of the SUs and the market shares of the PUs, respectively. In [26] , a similar concept of price-elastic demand is applied to a spectrum trading system catering to demand variations of SUs. In this paper, we expand the application of price-elastic demand to a system considering license boundaries and location-oriented channel utilities.
Firstly, given a spectrum sharing system consisting of only the mth PU and the nth SU, the demand of the nth SU will vary according to the channel price of the mth PU. Given its budget price ψ n , the SU would like to buy more channels to increase data rate if the channel price of the PU is low, and vice versa. A typical model to describe such price elasticity is the DLD model that has been applied to describing the demand of customers in the gasoline market [27] . Let d mn denote the demand after the nth SU has the price information of the mth PU. According to the DLD model,
where ζ 0 > 1, ζ 1 > 1 are constants, and mn is the demand that the nth SU offers to buy from the mth PU at ψ n . In this single-PU and single-SU system, mn = D n . Then we analyze a spectrum sharing system of multiple PUs and multiple SUs. In this case, the market shares of the PUs need to be determined. Since the channels of different PUs are different only in channel utilities, we regard the channels of different PUs as different brands. Therefore, the attempts of selling channels to the SUs can be interpreted as brand competitions. We apply the MNL model, a well-known method for the analysis of brand choice, to estimate mn out of the origin D n . Specifically,
where
is known as the multi-nomial logit that reflects the percentage of D n obtained by the mth PU. In the multi-PU and multi-SU system, d mn depends on not only the channel price of the mth PU but also the channel prices of all the other suppliers of the nth SU. The MNL model determines the share of D n that each PU can have, but does not change D n . Meanwhile, the DLD model describes the variation of the nth SU's demand on the mth PU because of price elasticity. Our demand model is applicable to both oligopoly and monopoly markets, which can be used to stimulate channel selection preferences of the SUs and to prevent the PUs from irrational high prices.
D. Problem Formulation
For the mth PU, the satisfaction of channels requests is not guaranteed, since S m is finite. Hence, the actual transaction number, b mn , is not necessarily equal to d mn . Meanwhile, the mth PU may be reluctant to sell all the channels in consideration of its potential payoff. In other words, b mn ≤ d mn and N n=1 t mn b mn ≤ S m . Therefore, the payoff of the mth PU is
We assume that each PU tries to achieve its maximum payoff. For the mth PU, the problem of interest is
subject to
Since the licensed block of the mth PU could be covered or partially overlapped by the licensed blocks of other PUs, the interest conflicts induced by competitions of selling channels in the same area are inevitable. As a result, the solution for the optimization problem in (7)- (10) is to find the best response to channel prices and channel transactions of all the other PUs which well fits a game theory framework.
III. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES OF PUs WITH NONHOMOGENEOUS SUs
In classical game theory, each PU must consider the strategies of other PUs to ensure its own strategy appropriate. However, the inequities of channel demands and supplies in our model add complexity for the PUs to find optimal pure strategies or mixed strategies. Meanwhile, analyzing the optimal strategies of other PUs requires more effort in a large system like ours. To solve the problem, we apply evolutionary games [28] . Therefore, each PU can adjust its strategy and achieve the ESS with its own payoff history. Furthermore, using evolutionary games can add robustness to our system when there are irrational PUs.
In general, the SUs have nonidentical budget prices. According to (3), the demand from each SU has to be analyzed individually. Hence, we define the SUs with nonidentical budget prices as nonhomogeneous SUs. In the following, we design evolutionary games to solve the problem in (7)-(10).
A. Quota Transaction Process
To apply evolutionary games, we design a quota transaction process, in which the PUs set the numbers of channels they would like to sell to particular SUs, or quotas. Specifically, the quota that the mth PU sets for the nth SU is k mn . Note that if t mn = 0, k mn = 0. There are two scenarios in the quota transaction process. If the mth PU sells channels without reserve, N n=1 k mn = S m . If the mth PU sells channels with reserve, N n=1 k mn < S m . As long as a quota is set, the transaction number should be under the quota, i.e.,
On the k mn -d mn plane, there are two possible situations.
We can view the unsold channels as reserved channels of the mth PU, without changing the transaction numbers and the payoff of the mth PU as if
Note that given b mn , the higher p mn is, the higher payoff can be obtained according to (7) . Meanwhile, a higher p mn indicates a lower d mn from (5). Hence, the highest payoff implies d mn = k mn . Therefore, we let k mn = d mn = b mn to maximize the payoff of each PU.
Given the quota information of the PUs, the payoff of each PU can be determined. For the mth PU, we denote N m as the set of SU indices satisfying t mn = 0. Hence, the payoff of the mth PU in the quota transaction process is
where p mn can be determined by
From (12), we notice that p mn can be expressed as a function of (k mn , k −mn ), where k −mn are the quotas set for the nth SU by the PUs other than the mth PU. Meanwhile, π m is related not only to the quotas of the mth PU, but also to the other PUs. For clarity, we further describe
denotes the quota vector of the mth PU and k −m the quota vectors of the PUs other than the mth PU.
Based on the above discussion, the original optimization problem in (7)- (10) can be transformed into
In the quota transaction process, we eliminate transaction situations that could not maximize the payoffs of the PUs, i.e., when d mn = b mn . Therefore, instead of being a function of prices and transaction numbers, the payoff of the mth PU can be adjusted by changing its quotas according to (13) . In addition, the mth PU no longer needs to consider constraint (9).
B. Formulation of Evolutionary Games
In our quota transaction process, each PU tries to set more quotas to the SUs with higher channel utility assessment. However, the payoff of a PU still depends on two other factors. Firstly, channel price is a decreasing function of channel supply. It does not necessarily guarantee that setting more quota can bring more payoff to the PU. Secondly, the PU has to consider the competitions of other PUs, which may reduce the expected payoff. Obviously, selling all channels to one SU is not an optimal solution. Therefore, each PU has to answer the following two questions. Which SUs to set non-zero quotas? How to set these non-zero quotas?
According to classical game theory, each PU needs to figure out the optimal strategies of other PUs, and then finds its best response of quotas. However, analyzing the optimal mixed strategies of other PUs requires more effort in a large system like ours. Instead, we suppose that the mth PU randomly sets non-zero initial quotas to the SUs in its licensed block. Afterwards, the mth PU changes its quotas according to its payoff history and gradually finds out the optimal strategy. Therefore, we formulate the optimization problem of the mth PU in (13)- (14) as evolutionary games, denoted by H m . If the mth PU sells channels without reserve, the virtual players are the S m channels. If the mth PU sells channels with reserve, the virtual players are S m channels (S m ≤ S m ). For each player, the strategy space is n|n ∈ N m . Hence, the payoff for each player who chooses strategy n isπ mn = p mn − C m − C T , and the population of the players who choose strategy n is k mn . Apparently, the quota vector k m includes all strategies of the players. Let K m [S m ] denote the set of quota vectors available to the mth PU in the scenario of selling channels without reserve, and K m [S m ] denote the set of quota vectors available to the mth PU in the scenario of selling channels with reserve. Since an ESS is an evolutionarily stable Nash equilibrium (NE) which prevents each player from alternating its strategy [28] , the optimization problem in (13) and (14) is equivalent to finding an ESS quota vector in K m [S m ] in the scenario of selling channels without reserve, or to finding an ESS quota vector in K m [S m ] in the scenario of selling channels with reserve.
C. ESS Quotas Without Channel Reserve
In this subsection, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of the ESS quota vector of each PU. We suppose that each PU has at least one SU to sell channels, and each PU sells channels without reserve. To obtain an ESS quota vector, the mth PU follows an evolutionary procedure defined as replicator dynamics [28] . In this procedure, to build the relationships between quotas and payoffs, the mth PU adjusts k m (τ ) in each contract period τ , τ = 1, 2, · · · . Note that the contract periods mark the iteration steps in the evolutionary games. Furthermore, we use contract periods to synchronize the evolutionary games played by the PUs. Since each PU plays its evolutionary games individually, different time lengths of contract periods will cause fluctuation on channel utilities in between transactions, and therefore cause system chaos. In our model, the default length of a contract period is set by the spectrum sharing system. Additionally, the transaction cost for each channel C T is related to the duration of a contract period. In practice, frequent channel transactions will reduce channel efficiency, and overlong duration of a contract period will decrease payoffs of PUs.
We set the replicator dynamics as
for all n ∈ N m , where
is the average channel payoff of the channels sold to the nth SU for the mth PU, and
is the average payoff of all the channels for the mth PU. Specifically, we havē
In (15), μ m > 0 is a multiplier to control the growth rate k mn (τ )/k mn (τ ) within (0, 1), which ensures the variation range of k mn (τ ) within (0, S m ) for any k mn (1) = 0 and k mn (1) = S m . Hence, negative quota will not emerge during the process.
Ifπ
), the mth PU will increase k mn (τ ) in the (τ +1) contract period, indicating selling more channels to the nth SU, and vice versa. Although each PU changes its quotas in each contract period, the stability of n∈N m k mn (τ ) is automatically satisfied in the replicator dynamics according to Proposition 1. Therefore, the constraint n∈N m k mn = S m is guaranteed. 
Proposition 2 shows that the replicator dynamics are myopic adjustment dynamics [29] . The quota variations by (15) can bring the mth PU a higher payoff, assuming the average channel payoff level does not change. Proposition 2 can be viewed as the motivation of the PUs to change quotas. Meanwhile, Proposition 2 also reveals that the mth PU will lose the impetus for quota change when the average channel payoffs from the SUs inside its licensed area are identical, i.e.,
We can determine a stable quota vector
of the mth PU for the following two case: 1) The mth PU has only one SU to sell channels, i.e., 2) The mth PU has at least two SUs to sell channels, i.e.,
And k * mn = 0 when n / ∈ N m . In the second case, sincē
holds for all n ∈ N m , the average channel payoffs from these SUs are identical. According to (16) , the channel prices for these SUs are equal. Denote the uniform price as ρ * m for the SUs in N m . Hence, ρ * m and k * mn , n ∈ N m , are the solutions to the following equations,
for all n ∈ N m . In this case, the mth PU does not adopt k mn = 0 or k mn = S m as possible quota when n ∈ N m , since neither of them depends on the payoff obtained from the nth SU. These two possible solutions will be represented as k mn → 0 and k mn → S m if either one happens.
In the following, we analyze the existence and uniqueness of k * mn , n ∈ N m . 
Theorem 2 indicates that under k * −m and constraint (20) , k * m is asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics, and thus an ESS quota vector [30] . Here we use constraint (20) to control the quota changing speed and to ensure the convergence of the evolutionary procedure theoretically. In practice, convergence can be easily achieved by setting an appropriate μ m in (15) so that k mn (τ ) is a small variation in comparison with k mn (τ ).
Since each PU tries to maximize its payoff and sells channels without reserve, π m (k * m , k * −m ) is the optimal stable payoff for the mth PU.
D. Learning Process for PUs Without Channel Reserve
In the case that the PUs sell channels without channel reserve, we propose a learning process to reach the ESS quotas. Without loss of generality, we assume that the PUs are unsophisticated users without knowing that ESS quotas indicate single-price policy in the replicator dynamics, and the PUs share quota information with others. At the same time, channel utilities and budget prices are accessible for all the PUs. In the learning process, the mth PU can obtain k * m with the payoff history of its own only. After setting an initial quota vector, the mth PU can calculate the channel price for each SU by (12) . Then the mth PU will adjust its quota vector according to (15) , redistributing channels among SUs to render higher average channel payoffs. When k mn = 0 for all n ∈ N m , the learning process will stop as the PUs have reached the ESS quota vectors.
However, the value of each ESS quota k * mn may have a fractional part and thus unrealizable for the PUs that sell each channel as a whole. Therefore, the PUs need to obtain the BIQ vectorsk * m , m = 1, · · · , M, by modifying the learning process as follows. Firstly, we round the ESS quotas to the nearest integers and thus n∈N m round(k mn (τ )) − S m = ω, where round(·) is the nearest integer function. If ω ≥ 0, we letk mn (τ ) = round(k mn (τ )) − 1 for the ω SUs bringing the least quota payoffs while round(k mn (τ )) = 0, and k mn (τ ) = round(k mn (τ )) for the other SUs. If ω < 0, we letk mn (τ ) = round(k mn (τ )) + 1 for the ω SUs bringing the highest quota payoffs, andk mn (τ ) = round(k mn (τ )) for the other SUs. As a result, the channel pricep * mn under BIQk * mn is different from ρ * m . The learning process can be described as in Algorithm 1. Note that the BIQs are not necessarily equal to the ESS quotas. Note that k mn , n ∈ N m may not converge to zero for the learning process to stop. Therefore, we set a maximum number of contract periods τ max .
In the evolutionary procedure, we let the PUs share quota information with each other to reduce the complexity and overhead of obtaining channel prices to sell allocated quotas. However, channel prices can be obtained by designing another learning process without knowing the quota information of other PUs. In a contract period, the SUs will continuously feed demands back to the PUs for given channel prices till demands equal quotas. Then we obtain the channel prices to sell allocated quotas. We omit this learning process due to space limit.
E. ESS Quotas With Channel Reserve
To achieve a higher payoff, the mth PU may sell some but not all of its channels, i.e., 1) The mth PU has only one SU to sell channels, i.e., (16) and (17) (21) and
To further increase the payoff, the mth PU needs to find the optimal supply S * m according to the optimal supplies of the other PUs S * −m . In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we can anticipate that the optimal payoff of each PU will be obtained by an ESS quota vector. In other words, the mth PU should adopt a single-price policy to search for S * m . 
Algorithm 2 Learning Process for PUs With Channel Reserve
1: Initialize: S m (1) = S m , S m (2) = S m (1) − 1, π m (k * m [S m (1)], k * −m [S −m (1)]) =π m (k * m , k * −m ),
F. Learning Process for PUs With Channel Reserve
In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, the PUs need to search for the ESS quota vectors repeatedly for selected supplies of the PUs. Therefore, it is more difficult and time consuming for the mth PU to find the optimal supply S * m and the ESS quota vector k * m [S * m ], compared with that in the scenario of selling channels without reserve.
To reach the optimal supplies (S * 1 , · · · , S * M ), we propose a learning process for the PUs that sell channels with reserve. Without loss of generality, we assume that the PUs are unsophisticated users without the knowledge that ρ * m [S * m ] may be equal to
The learning process consists of several iterations. The iteration sequence is indexed by β and the supplies of the PUs can be adjusted once in each iteration. Then the ESS quota vectors and the payoff levels of the PUs can be obtained by Algorithm 1 based on the supplies of the PUs. Afterwards, based on the variations of the payoff levels, the PUs can adjust the supplies in the next iteration. By applying the secant line method [31] , the supply change of the mth PU is
where φ m is a constant that defines the supply variation step of the mth PU. When S m < σ for m = 1, · · · , M, where σ is a small tolerance, the learning process will stop as the PUs obtain the optimal supplies (S * 1 , · · · , S * M ). The learning process can be described as in Algorithm 2. To reduce the complexity, we assume the initial supply of the mth PU is S m and the mth PU searches for S * m by decreasing channel supply. The maximum number of iterations is β max .
IV. EVOLUTIONARY GAMES OF PUs WITH HOMOGENEOUS SUs
SUs using the same frequency band often have identical budget prices. In other words, the SUs are homogeneous in our model. To simplify the evolutionary procedure for homogeneous SUs, we introduce the utility zones, based on which we group the SUs and apply evolutionary games to groups of SUs.
A. Utility Zone
For homogeneous SUs, we set several utility zones for each PU. The SUs in each utility zone will obtain similar channel capacities when buying channels from the corresponding PU.
We divide A m into Z m utility zones. For the zth utility zone of the mth PU, the estimated channel capacity isũ m,z , and 
B. Grouping Mechanism
The SUs with the same PUs as their suppliers, and in the same utility zone of each supplying PU, belong to one group. In each group, the SUs have identical selection preference on suppliers and therefore can be treated as a single unit.
Suppose there are G groups of SUs in the spectrum sharing system. Similar to the nonhomogeneous scenario, we usê t mg = 1 to denote the acceptance andt mg = 0 the denial of a transaction that group g offers to buy channels from the mth PU. We further definep mg as the channel price at which the mth PU expects to sell to group g,d mg as the number of channels that group g offers to buy from the mth PU after obtaining the information of channel prices,b mg as the number of channels that group g actually buys from the mth PU, and k mg as the quota that the mth PU sets for group g. We havê
D n , N g is the set of SU indices in group g, ψ g is the budget price of the homogeneous SUs in group g, andÛ mg is the channel utility obtained by an SU in group g if the SU buys a channel from the mth PU. Here we suppose that the SUs in group g obtain identical channel capacity if the SUs buy channels from the same PU. Specifically,
where z g reveals the utility zone index in which group g is located. Moreover, the payoff of the mth PU in the quota transaction process iŝ
where G m is the set of group indices such thatt mg = 0. We can similarly apply the quota transaction process to the spectrum sharing system with M PUs and G SU groups. Fig. 2 . Illustration of the system in our simulation and the utility zones in grouping mechanism.
The replicator dynamics is
for all g ∈ G m , where k mg ,μ m ,π mg , andπ m are the counterparts of k mg , μ m ,π mg , andπ m in (15) . As a result, when the PUs sell channels without reserve, the ESS quotas in our grouping mechanism can be obtained by following the replicator dynamics defined in (27) , and the BIQs in our grouping mechanism can be obtained by the learning process described by Algorithm 1. In addition, when the PUs sell channels with reserve to achieve optimal supplies, the ESS quotas that leads to the optimal payoff for the mth PU in our grouping mechanism isk * m [Ŝ * m ], and the BIQs that leads to the optimal realizable payoff for the mth PU in our grouping mechanism can be obtained by the learning process described by Algorithm 2.
Compared with the quota transaction process and the learning process in the scenario of nonhomogeneous SUs, the computational complexity in our grouping mechanism is reduced. In each contract period or iteration, only M × G variables need to be determined instead of M × N variables. On the other hand, the larger the number of utility zones is, the more accurate the estimated channel capacity in a utility zone will be. With the increase of the number of utility zones, the channel allocation results of the grouping mechanism will approach the results of the individual analysis.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Parameters
We study a system with 3 PUs. The licensed blocks of these PUs are rectangular, similar to the geographic licensing schemes of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) [32] , [33] . In this system, homogeneous SUs whose budget price is 40 per channel are uniformly distributed. When channel price equals the budget price, each SU has a demand of 4 channels. Figure 2 gives an illustration of the system in our simulation.
We suppose that the channels of the PUs are Rayleigh fading channels with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) [34] , Fig. 3 . Total channel payoffs for selected 2 PUs and system throughput in individual analysis and grouping mechanism when N = 100. and the average power over each channel¯ T hr at the licensed block boundary is 2 × 10 −10 W under the interference temperature constraint [35] . According to the two-ray model [36] ,
where ω is the channel gain that follows complex normal distribution CN (0, 1) [34] , r mn is the minimum distance from (x n , y n ) to the boundary of A m , α is the path loss exponent, ξ n is a constant related to the nth SU's antenna, and ε 0 /2 is the power spectral density of AWGN. In our simulation, we let α = 4 to simulate typical urban areas [36] , ξ n = 10 6 , ε 0 /2 = 3 × 10 −18 W/Hz, and the channel bandwidth W m = 1 MHz. Under these assumptions, we illustrate the grouping mechanism when each PU has 2 utility zones in Figure 2 . Meanwhile, we set δ = 10 −5 and γ = 0.1 to make the channel capacity comparable to the price-income sensitivity. In addition, we assume that channel demand is 10D n when channel price is 
B. Selling Channels Without Reserve
In this scenario, each PU has a supply of 50 idle channels, and the cost C m + C T = 10. We set μ m for the individual analysis as
andμ m similarly in grouping mechanism. Firstly, we suppose there are 100 SUs in the system. Figure 3 shows the total channel payoffs in 20 contract periods for selected 2 PUs in both individual analysis and grouping mechanism. Meanwhile, Figure 3 shows the channel capacities obtained by all the SUs in the system in the same contract periods. The total channel payoffs in the searches for BIQs in the individual analysis fluctuate in tiny amounts after about 5 contract periods. These fluctuations come from the integerization of the ESS quotas. In contrast, the total channel Average total channel payoff of PU1, and normalized standard deviation (NSTD) of the payoff differences between BIQs and ESS quotas. payoffs in the grouping mechanism when each PU has 2 utility zones converge to constant values in about 10 contract periods. Due to a relatively large quota in the grouping mechanism, integerization of the ESS quotas does not affect a large portion of quotas. In addition, the total channel payoffs of the BIQs in the grouping mechanism are close to those in the individual analysis. Therefore, our grouping mechanism is a good way to simplify the individual analysis. Additionally, the payoff variation ranges after several contract periods are very small, indicating that quota changes do not bring significant payoff increases. If we consider the cost of switching channels of the SUs, fewer contract periods are needed for the convergence process to stop.
From Figure 3 , the system throughput obtained by the SUs also increases to a higher level in our learning process of maximizing the payoffs of the PUs. Therefore, the quota transaction process together with the evolutionary procedure does increase the spectrum efficiency of the whole system. Note that the system throughput fluctuation in the searches for BIQs in the individual analysis also comes from the integerization of the ESS quotas.
To further study the reliability of our method, we change the number of SUs from 10 to 200. And we calculate the ESS quotas in the individual analysis and the BIQs in both individual analysis and grouping mechanism for 100 different SU distributions by following our learning processes. Figure 4 shows the average total channel payoffs of PU1. Meanwhile, we use the total channel payoffs of the ESS quotas in the individual analysis as our baseline to study the accuracy of the payoffs of the BIQs. Figure 4 also shows the normalized standard deviation (NSTD) of payoff differences of the ESS quotas in the individual analysis and the BIQs in both individual analysis and grouping mechanism.
From Figure 4 , the average total channel payoffs of the BIQs in the individual analysis are close to those of the ESS quotas and the NSTD of payoff differences is relatively small if the number of SUs is under 140. Meanwhile, the average total channel payoffs of the BIQs in the grouping mechanism are close to those of the ESS quotas for any number of SUs, but the NSTD of payoff differences are relatively large if the number of SUs is under 30. Therefore, BIQs in the individual analysis are better choices for a small number of SUs, while BIQs in the grouping mechanism are better choices for a large number of SUs.
C. Selling Channels With Reserve
In this scenario, we analyze the trends of the total channel payoffs of the PUs with the increase of their supplies. Suppose there are 100 SUs in the system and let C m + C T = 10. Changing the supply of each PU from 10 to 910, we calculate the total channel payoffs of each PU by following Algorithm 2. Figure 5 shows the total channel payoffs of the ESS quotas in the individual analysis of PU2 for 5 different cost combinations in the scenario of selling channels with reserve. When PU2 only has a small number of channels to sell, the total channel payoff in the scenario of selling channels with reserve is the same as that in the scenario of selling channels without reserve. But if we increase the supply continuously, there always exists a point at which PU2 will consider selling some but not all of its channels to make higher profit. And this supply point will increase with the decrease of the channel transaction cost C T .
D. Comparison With Centralized PUs
In a centralized system, channel transactions of all PUs are controlled by a central agent to maximize the payoff of the system [37] , while non-cooperative PUs only care about their own payoffs. Suppose the parameters of the centralized system are identical to our non-cooperative system, there are 100 SUs in both systems, and let C m + C T = 10. Figure 6 shows the optimal total channel payoff comparison between non-cooperative PUs and centralized PUs when they sell channels without reserve. The optimal total channel payoffs of both systems are identical. In the centralized system, the PUs do not compete with each other. Therefore, the multinomial logit
t in e U in in (5) always equals 1. In this case, the central agent randomly distributes the channels, and is reluctant to distribute the channels in an efficient way, i.e., providing more system throughput with no profit increase. In the non-cooperative system, the competitions of the PUs in different areas provide them incentives to delicately distribute the channels. Therefore, the optimal total channel payoffs of individual PUs differ from each other based on channel utilities. Furthermore, the competitiveness leads to a lower efficiency in terms of iteration steps used to achieve the optimal payoff, but at the same time increases the system throughput in comparison with the average system throughput of random channel distribution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we consider a spectrum sharing system in which the licensed areas of the PUs and the locations of the SUs play important roles, and we seek to maximize the payoffs of the PUs in such a system. For each PU, the geographic information not only distinguishes the eligible SUs to sell channels, but also determines the potential competitors. In our model, the PUs adopt a multi-price policy and have the pricing power. We employed a generalized utility model in which both the channel capacities and the channel prices in the forms of price-income sensitivity functions are considered. Meanwhile, we established a price-elastic demand model that incorporates the DLD and MNL models and is applicable to both oligopoly and monopoly markets, two common market forms for spectrum sharing. To solve the problem, we proposed a unique transaction process and discussed two different scenarios. In the scenario of selling channels without reserve, we proved the existence and the uniqueness of the ESS quota vector of each PU by applying an evolutionary procedure defined as replicator dynamics. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predicted the channel prices for the PUs to render the optimal supplies of the PUs. Meanwhile, we designed two learning processes for both scenarios. Furthermore, we introduced a grouping mechanism for homogeneous SUs to simplify the process. In our simulation, we verified the effectiveness of the learning processes and the efficiency of our spectrum sharing scheme. According to (15) , 
where ρ m is a uniform channel price set by the mth PU. S m ) , n ∈ N m , ρ * m is the unique positive solution that satisfies (18) and (19) . Correspondingly, k * mn , n ∈ N m , is the unique solution to (18) and (19) . Therefore, we conclude that k * m always exists and is unique.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: In contract period τ , we denote N + m as the set of SU indices whose quotas will be increased, and N − m as the set of SU indices whose quotas will be decreased, and N 
